how singapore and other countries fight corruption :

this is a wonderful ,concise report about the corruption ending case study of some countries, including singapore. 
   


this is a fantastic report : 

Anti-Corruption Commissions: Panacea or Real Medicine to Fight Corruption? 
John R. Heilbrunn 
2004. 21 pages. Stock No. 37234


link : 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/wbi37234Heilbrunn.pdf


\Contents 
Introduction     1 
Hong Kong’s ICAC: The Universal Model     3
Singapore’s CPIB: the Investigative Model     5
The New South Wales ICAC: the Parliamentary Model     7
The United States Office of Government Ethics: the Multi-Agency Model     9
Other Experiences     10
Unraveling the Puzzle     13
Conclusion     14
Endnotes     16


worthful notings : 


Conclusion 

Anti-corruption agencies are part of a number of strategies that together can reduce venality in a 
government. Some of these strategies are absolutely crucial, including 
first the independence of a commission. 


Second, commissions need a clear reporting hierarchy that comprises executive 
officials, parliamentary authorities, and oversight committees. 


Third, governments must have a commitment to enact reforms that may be politically difficult. How a government is able to enact 
these strategies requires negotiations among key actors in the government, civil society, and the 
media. It is apparent from the cases above that the capacity to enact controversial reforms is 
problematic and many governments fail in their efforts to do so. 


The first key variable that might explain a failure to reduce corruption through the establishment 
of an anti-corruption agency is the absence of laws necessary for its success. Without the legal 
tools to go after venal officials, a commission cannot succeed. Many governments either fail to 
enforce existing laws or the commissions have no mandate to enforce laws. 


Second, a commission must be independent from interference by the political leadership.


 In some circumstances, a commission linked to the executive branch is used to settle old scores with 
political rivals. When the agency is linked only to the Parliament, then the security agencies have 
a disincentive to include parliamentary committees in their investigations. A competitive 
relationship may evolve among parliamentarians and national crime investigators. The anticorruption commission thereby loses credibility as nothing more than a tool of the parliament.
  
Third, a clear reporting hierarchy may seem elementary, but it is not a straightforward arranagement. An optimal a hierarchy might be reports delivered to the director of the 
organization, oversight committees, and then simultaneously shared with the Parliament and the 
executive. However, some executives prefer to receive reports without the bother of any
hierarchy. This arrangement means that the executive branch monopolizes the information and 
eliminates any accountability from independent agencies. 


In Ghana, for instance, the constitution stipulates that the Auditor General reports directly to the president in a confidential report that the executive may release at his discretion. As a consequence, the audits lack transparency and the president withholds information that may potentially be damaging to the administration. With the 
insertion of an unambiguous hierarchy whereby reports are transparent and accountability 
agencies operate on the basis of information contained therein, an anti-corruption agency is both 
independent and more importantly, legitimate. 


Fourth, the presence of oversight committees is absolutely crucial to the effective organization of 
an anti-corruption commission. In Hong Kong, oversight committees provide a control over the 
ICAC and prevent it from any persecution of political opponents. The two committees found in 
New South Wales attest to the potential of parliaments in controlling potential excesses of anticorruption agencies. By contrast, the absence of oversight committees in Singapore is evidence of 
the political nature of the CPIB and its centrality to the semi-authoritarian regime. It is through 
the activities of oversight committees that an anti-corruption commission links to parliament and 
civil society groups that fight venality in the public sector. 


Finally, some evidence suggests that the size of a country, either geographically or in terms of its 
population may explain the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts. Hong Kong and Singapore
each have substantial populations living in a small geographic area. An argument that the 
geographic size of the country determines capacity to control venality has some credence. Despite 
the facility of that argument, the ability to shift norms from acceptance of corruption, to draft new 
laws that create rules prohibiting, and implementing credible enforcement bodies is a daunting 
task that requires a high degree of political commitment on the part of the leadership and its 
constituents.  

   

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